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Abstract 
Party dominance is not clearly conceptualized and operationalized in the existing literature 
and has rarely been quantitatively assessed and explained. This study defines dominance as 
a combination of absolute dominance – the percentage of parliamentary seats won by the 
largest ruling party – and relative dominance, which takes into account the strength of its 
main competitor. Based on this definition, it would be possible to calculate an average score 
of party dominance over a defined period of time. The index developed here is applied to the 
main ruling parties in 54 regions from 1995 to 2015. Variation in regional party dominance 
during this period is then explained by considering dominance at the national level, 
differences in regional socioeconomic development and political legacies. In the last part of 
the article, individual party scores are aggregated by region. Association between this new 
aggregate score and regional quality of government is tested. 
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The issue of party dominance has been discussed by many scholars focusing on national or 
subnational politics. However, so far the definition and operationalization of this concept has 
remained quite vague. Most importantly, dominance has rarely been included in quantitative 
analyses as a dependent, independent or control variable. This is quite surprising since the 
ability of parties to shape the political agenda and impact on public policies is greatly 
enhanced when they are able to play a key role in government for a considerable period of 
time and are not seriously challenged by competitors. At the same time, there is great 
variation in the stability and composition of governments in Europe and beyond. Some 
countries have been ruled for long periods by the same party, either alone or in coalition with 
junior partners, others have experienced higher levels of party alternation in government and 
tighter competition between opposing parties. 
Variation in party dominance is noticeable not only across countries but also, and 
perhaps to an even greater extent, within countries. The rise of the ‘meso’ has become an 
important political issue in Europe (Keating 2013) and dominance does not occur only at one 
level but is a phenomenon that may affect vertical relations between national, regional and 
local representative institutions. Such relations have become more complex and politically 
relevant in recent years. The study of ‘sub-state’ dominance would allow the research 
community to gain new insights into multilevel partisan dynamics and may be particularly 
relevant for research on domestic intergovernmental relations (Bolleyer 2009). Furthermore, 
considering patterns of party dominance at the regional level may help explain interactions 
between regions and the EU (Tatham 2016) or regional policy-making (Vampa 2016). 
This article aims to discuss and refine some conceptual and empirical aspects of 
dominance. This is done by developing a new measure of party dominance that can be easily 
applied to a wide range of quantitative empirical studies. The focus is on subnational (or 
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regional1) dominance in three countries with strong ‘meso-level’ authorities (Sharpe 1993; 
Fargion 1997; Börzel 2002): Italy, Spain and Germany. These three countries have been 
selected because they include more than half of the democratically elected regional 
governments (excluding counties) in the European Union. Additionally, in these countries 
regional governments have been in place for more than 30 years, thus allowing an assessment 
of the impact of long-term legacies on patterns of regional dominance. Therefore, the analysis 
is based on a relatively large number of political entities (54) and seeks to explain within-
country variation in political equilibriums and dynamics.  
The next section starts from a review of key studies and then moves to a conceptual 
and operational definition of party dominance based on the dimensions of absolute and 
relative dominance, which are in turn linked to time. A dominance score is calculated for all 
the ruling parties of Spanish, Italian and German regions between 1995 and 2015. An example 
of application of the index to a quantitative analysis is then provided, showing that the impact 
of national dominance on regional dominance is mediated by socioeconomic factors. Legacies 
are also important predictors or regional dominance. The final part of the article reflects on 
how individual party scores should be aggregated by region (or any other polity). An 
‘aggregate regional dominance’ score is developed and is applied to the study of quality of 
government. Although the article does not provide any normative argument, preliminary 
evidence shows that there is a positive association between party dominance and quality of 
government. 
 
Conceptualizing and operationalizing party dominance 
Any attempt to provide a clear definition (and operationalization) of dominance should start 
from a review of the main studies reflecting on this important aspect of party politics. Despite 
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being relatively fragmented, the literature on dominance seems to focus on two key 
dimensions: absolute and relative dominance. A third element is time: that is, how long a 
party has been in power. However, the literature has tended to complicate the picture by 
imposing categories and thresholds, which are often arbitrary and, as a consequence, are 
continuously challenged. In addition, various definitions and operationalizations of 
dominance are mainly used for the selection of qualitative case studies and are difficult to 
apply to large-N analyses. The aim of this section is to develop a continuous measure of 
dominance which includes all the dimensions mentioned above. 
One of the first definitions of dominant party was provided by Maurice Duverger 
(1954). According to the French scholar, we have a dominant party when its ‘influence 
exceeds all others for a generation or more’, and its ‘doctrines, ideas, methods, its style, so 
to speak, coincide with those of the epoch’ (Duverger 1954: 308). This definition effectively 
captured some of the key aspects of dominance, although it did not provide clear indicators 
which would allow scholars to assess dominance empirically and develop quantitative 
comparisons across many cases. 
Giovanni Sartori (1976: 193) moved from Duverger’s starting point and proposed a 
simpler definition of dominant party: 
 
Whenever we find … a party that outdistances all the others, this party is dominant 
in that it is significantly stronger than the others. 
 
Sartori also explicitly compared the largest ruling party to its main competitor in order to 
assess its level of dominance. He mainly referred to electoral returns rather than legislative 
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strength but the interesting point he made is that dominance is assessed in relation to the 
competition faced by the ruling party. 
Sartori’s definitions of dominance and pre-dominance are central in Matthijs 
Bogaards’s (2004) study of dominant parties and party systems in Africa. Bogaards does not 
just consider the share of the votes but also refers to the share of the seats obtained by the 
‘runner-up’. Therefore, the legislative strength of the largest competitor is explicitly taken 
into account when assessing the dominance of ruling parties. However, it is not clear how 
each factor considered by Bogaards – vote share, seat shares of winner and runner-up – 
contribute to an overall assessment of dominance. A consequence of not linking different 
indicators together is that it is not possible to rank parties from the most to the least 
dominant, since no single measure is provided. Things become even more complicated when 
we move from parties to party systems. Bogaards (2004: 288) criticizes ‘continuous 
measures’, such as the number of effective parties, and warns that they may suggest ‘relevant 
variation where there is none’. Yet the opposite is also true and indeed Bogaards, who mainly 
relies on Sartori’s definition, ends up considering as dominant systems those with ruling 
parties controlling between 48.9% and 100% of the parliamentary seats. Generally, the 
discrepancies and contradictions existing in the literature, also highlighted by Bogaards, seem 
to derive from a tendency to convert quantitative, continuous indexes into qualitative, 
categorical typologies (and vice versa). To avoid these contradictions, this article aims to 
provide a multidimensional, continuous measure of dominance, without setting any 
categorical classification based on qualitative aspects of party competition. The two strategies 
may be complementary but should not overlap. One may rely on a mixed-method strategy 
(Lieberman 2005) and use continuous quantitative measures to identify interesting cases of 
party dominance, which could then be qualitatively analysed. 
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T.J. Pempel’s (1990: 3–4) definition seems more compatible with the development of 
a continuous measure of dominance. He argues that one key aspect of dominance is that a 
party must be dominant in number. This means that it should win a larger number of seats 
than its opponents. Interestingly, Pempel does not set a specific threshold beyond which we 
can categorize a party as dominant but just refers to a ‘plurality’ of seats. Another important 
aspect of this definition is that it excludes minor parties involved in governing coalitions. Of 
course, these minor parties may play an important, pivotal role, since they may be necessary 
for the formation of a government (winning) coalition (Bolleyer 2007). However, given their 
role as junior coalition partners of a larger party, they can be defined as a dominance enabler, 
rather than dominant. Indeed, they may be crucial in keeping larger parties in government 
and helping them preserve their dominant role in the party system. 
Two other factors identified by Pempel may be important for the development of a 
measure of dominance: governmental dominance and chronological dominance. In order to 
be dominant, a party has to be at the core of the government over a substantial period of 
time. This last point adds a ‘dynamic’, ‘longitudinal’ aspect to the definition of dominance. 
Again, no threshold is set, and this is quite crucial if, instead of providing rigid categories, we 
want to measure dominance on a continuum. The importance of adding a time dimension to 
dominance, without imposing discrete categories, is also underlined by Jingjing Huo (2005). 
However, Huo’s definition deviates from Pempel’s one in respect of governmental 
dominance. Huo identifies two dimensions of dominance – electoral and governmental – and 
also calculates scores of dominance for parties that have never been in power. This article 
opts for the definition provided by Pempel and focuses on the largest ruling parties. Indeed, 
it would be problematic to assess the dominance of political forces that have not even been 
able to control the executive at least once over a relatively long period of time. Generally, 
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extending the concept of dominance to junior coalition parties and parties in permanent 
opposition may result in conceptual ‘overstretch’ (Sartori 1970).2 Political dominance would 
lose its analytical utility if used interchangeably with political relevance, because the latter 
concept applies to a much larger number of parties. If we stick to Pempel’s definition, only a 
subgroup of relevant parties, namely the largest ruling parties across different polities, will be 
assessed, compared and ranked in terms of their dominance. All other parties may still be 
assessed as more or less relevant rather than dominant. 
Based on the above discussion of various definitions and operationalization strategies, 
it is possible to identify two key dimensions of dominance. The first dimension is the absolute 
dominance of the main ruling party. The larger the share of seats such a party controls in 
parliament, the more dominant this party will be in the legislative process. This aspect is also 
included by Huo (2005: 746) in his operationalization of ‘electoral dominance’. However, Huo 
does not consider the fact that the dominant role of a party also depends on the strength of 
its main competitor. Indeed, a strong opposition party (or coalition partner if the main 
competitor is also a ruling party, as happens in the event of a grand coalition) would place 
more pressure on the main ruling party than a small competitor. Thus, absolute dominance 
tells us only part of the story and is not very meaningful if it is not combined with relative 
dominance. For instance, there is a big difference between a ruling party controlling 55% of 
the seats with its main competitor being at 45% and a ruling party still controlling 55% of the 
seats with the largest competitor winning only 25% of the seats. Equally, relative dominance 
should not be considered as a sufficient indicator of dominance. Again, a ruling party with 
twice as many seats as its main competitor would clearly be more dominant if its absolute 
share of seats was 60% rather than only 30%. 
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Since the meaning of each of the two dimensions identified above depends on the 
other, it makes sense to multiply them (Goertz 2006: 95–128) to obtain an overall measure 
of ruling party dominance within a legislature. We can also say that relative dominance is 
weighted by the absolute share of seats that the main ruling party obtains. The formula to 
calculate dominance is summarized thus: 
𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 (𝑑) =  𝐴𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑒 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 = 𝑠 ∗ ( 
𝑠 
𝑐
 ) 
Where s is the share of parliamentary seats controlled by the largest party in government and 
c is the share of parliamentary seats controlled by its main competitor, which can either be 
an opposition party or a coalition partner (in the case of grand coalitions). When a party 
moves into opposition, it is no longer the largest governing party and its d will equal 0. 
Yet d only provides a score of dominance at a single point in time (i.e. one particular 
year) but does not tell us how dominant a party has been over a substantial period of time 
(several years). The time dimension of dominance is taken into account by calculating the 
average dominance score of a party that has been in government at least once over a defined 
period of time. Therefore an overall measure of party dominance (D instead of d) is given by 
the following formula: 
𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 (𝐷) =  
∑ 𝑑𝑛𝑖=1
𝑡
 
Yearly d scores are added up and then divided by the number of years of the period 
considered (t). This is basically an average since, when we calculate the overall dominance of 
a party, the number of its d scores (n) corresponds to t. 
It should be highlighted that party dominance is conceptually different from (although 
it might be related to) electoral vulnerability. This concept was developed and operationalized 
by Ellen Immergut and Tarik Abou-Chadi (2014) and is based on two dimensions: electoral 
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pressure and political protection. The first dimension, which includes volatility, 
disproportionality, effective number of parties and fraction of electoral winners, may be 
causally linked to dominance. For instance, systems characterized by low levels of volatility 
and high disproportionality of the voting system may have a positive impact on party 
dominance. Yet including these aspects in a definition of dominance would risk conflating 
causes and effects. The second dimension, political protection, which considers the size of 
governmental majority in relation to the number of governing parties, comes closer to the 
definition of dominance that is developed here. Yet this measure completely ignores the 
relationship between the largest governing parties and its main competitor (i.e. relative 
dominance). It might be that the governing coalition has a very small majority (or is even a 
minority government), but it manages to stay in power because the opposition is highly 
fragmented and the main opposition party obtains considerably fewer seats than the largest 
governing party and is unable to coalesce with other opposition parties. 
This study focuses on party dominance at the subnational level. This aspect has often 
been neglected by literature on party dominance, which is still clearly influenced by what has 
been defined as ‘methodological nationalism’ (Jeffery 2008). The scant attention paid to the 
subnational dimension is surprising given the variation existing within countries, which is even 
greater than across countries. Comparing different regions within the same country would 
also allow to control for ‘statewide’ institutional, economic, political and social characteristics 
and focus on a limited number of region-specific variables to explain the causes or effects of 
dominance. Additionally, as shown in the following sections, political dynamics are usually 
more fluid at the national level, particularly in advanced democracies, and parties are more 
able to exert long-term control of government in some subnational contexts. Therefore, high 
levels of dominance are more typical of municipalities and regions than countries. It should 
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also be noted that the strengthening of the regional level of government, the rise of the so-
called ‘meso’, has been qualitatively and quantitatively assessed by several studies (Hooghe 
et al. 2010; Keating 2013) and has attracted increasing attention from scholars focusing on 
quality of government (Putnam 1993; Charron et al. 2014; Argenberg 2017). Therefore, an 
exclusive focus on the national dimension would neglect important territorial shifts in political 
and policy-making processes. This, however, does not mean that the measure developed here 
could not be applied to countries or regions beyond those of the three countries included in 
this article. In fact, one of the positive aspects of this index is that it can be used for a much 
larger number of cases at different levels of government below or above the regional one. In 
some respects, this study already applies the index to different levels, since its empirical 
analysis also considers the association between regional and national dominance. 
In the existing literature, only the edited volume by Matthijs Bogaards and François 
Boucek (2010) includes two chapters considering regional dominance. One by Amir Abedi and 
Steffen Schneidder (2010) focuses on the Canadian provinces and German Länder; the other 
one, by Gordon Smith (2010), focuses on the Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU) as a case 
of a regionally dominant party. Key aspects of Abedi and Schneider’s analysis are the focus on 
seats, rather than votes, controlled by ruling parties at the regional level, the development of 
a quantitative measure of relative dominance (the ‘power’ dimension) and the addition of a 
time dimension of dominance. However, rather than creating a single, continuous measure 
of dominance including both dimensions, the two authors rely on power and time to define 
different categories of dominance, which are not applied to a quantitative analysis but are 
only used for the selection of qualitative case studies. 
In the same book, Jean-François Caulier and Patrick Dumont (2010) do not directly 
assess dominance of an individual party over a certain period of time but focus on the party 
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system and provide two indexes which measure the effective number of relevant parties 
(ENRP) and the maximum contribution index of fragmentation (M) after a single election. In 
the same way as the index presented here, their indexes focus on legislative seat shares and 
are refinements of more traditional indexes of fragmentation (particularly Laakso and 
Taagepera 1979). Yet their empirical application is limited to systems that are already well 
known as being characterized by high levels of dominance (Sweden and Ireland between 1970 
and 2006). Lastly, they admit the difficulty of averaging their indexes over a defined period of 
time (in fact, they do not consider number of years but elections) and, as a consequence, do 
not directly incorporate a longitudinal dimension in their measure of dominance. 
The next section shows that one of the advantages of D is that different levels of 
dominance across a large number of regions are assessed through a single, but 
multidimensional, measure which can also be used in explanatory quantitative analyses. It 
should be highlighted that this article focuses on systems in which the government depends 
on a majority vote in the legislative body.3 This decision is based on the fact that the 
overwhelming majority of European countries and regions can be classified as parliamentary 
systems. Application of the index to presidential systems is mentioned in the conclusion as a 
possible future development. 
 
Party dominance in Italian, Spanish and German regions 
D is now applied to the main ruling parties of 54 Italian, Spanish and German regions in the 
period from 1995 to 2015.4 The total number of parties included in the sample is 95. As an 
example, the Appendix reports the calculation of dominance scores for the Social Democratic 
Party of Germany (SPD) and the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in Lower Saxony (Table 
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A1). The average of the dominance scores over the 21-year period is 0.302 for the SPD and 
0.321 for the CDU. 
D scores of all 95 parties are in the third column of Table A2 (in the Appendix). The top 
10 of the ranking includes three regionalist parties of the so-called ‘Alpine’ macro-region 
(Caramani and Mény 2005): the South Tyrolean People’s Party (SVP), the Valdostan Union 
(UV) and the CSU. We also find the regional branches of the Italian Democratic Party (PD), the 
successor of the post-communist party, which in 2007 merged with left-wing Christian 
Democrats (Vampa 2009).5 This party is particularly strong in Tuscany, Emilia Romagna and 
Umbria, which are characterized by a left-wing ‘political sub-culture’ (Trigilia 1986). Finally, 
the regional branches of two statewide conservative parties are also included in this top list: 
the CDU in Saxony and the Spanish People’s Party (PP) in Murcia, Castile and Leon, and Galicia. 
As stated above, the aim of this study is not to provide categorizations and thresholds, 
which may be seen as arbitrary. Rather, D places dominance on a continuum and lacks an 
upper boundary. It is multidimensional and can be easily applied to quantitative analysis, as 
shown in the examples provided in later sections of this article. However, it is not clear how 
D scores can be used in mixed-methods studies. Indeed, setting specific thresholds and 
boundaries may become particularly relevant for case selection when qualitative analysis 
follows, and complements, quantitative analysis. One way to address this issue is to look at 
the distribution of the cases included in the sample and, for instance, consider the scores 
within the upper quartile as ‘high dominance’, those in the interquartile range as ‘medium 
dominance’ and those in the lower quartile as ‘low dominance’. Table 1 shows the range of 
values for each group within the sample. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
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Weighting dominance scores and comparing D with other measures 
As shown above, the overall dominance (D) of a particular party is calculated by dividing the 
sum of its yearly dominance scores (d) by the number of years of the period considered (t). 
Since a party is assigned a d score of 0 for each year in opposition, the longer the party stays 
in opposition during t, the lower its overall D. Conversely, D will tend to be higher for parties 
that have spent most of t in government. It may be argued that this formula, despite including 
a time dimension, does not account for the fact that each additional year of continuous 
government contributes to consolidating the dominant position of a party. A refinement of 
the index of dominance could take into account this particular aspect by assigning different 
weights to each d score. Of course, this strategy should be carefully considered because the 
decision to introduce different weights could be seen as arbitrary and could be challenged by 
other scholars. 
A possible solution would be to multiply each d by an increasing factor. The first d of 
the series could be multiplied by just 1, the next one by a higher factor, the one after by an 
even higher factor and so on until the party loses its governmental position. By how much 
should the factor increase? This study covers the period from 1995 to 2015. The total number 
of years (t) is 21, but if we consider 1995 as year 0 of the series, then the last year (2015) will 
be number 20. Therefore, each additional year could lead to a 1/20 (0.05) increase in the 
value of the weighting factor. This means that the first d of the series can be simply multiplied 
by 1, the second one by 1.05, the third one by 1.10 and so on. If a party stays in government 
for the whole period (from 1995 to 2015) the last d will be multiplied by 2, thus being 
weighted twice as much as the first d in the series. Of course, if a party loses the election and 
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goes into opposition but then returns to power, the series would start again from 1. In this 
way, the weighting would ‘reward’ continuity in power. 
The weighting formula can be summarized as follows: 
 
𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 (𝑤𝑑) = 𝑑 ∗ [1 + (
1
𝑡 − 1
) ∗ 𝑔] 
 
Where d is the yearly score of dominance of a party, t - 1 is the total number of years of the 
period considered minus one because the first year is the starting point of the series. Finally, 
g is the number of years the party has continuously been in government during the period 
considered. As in the case of D, an overall (weighted) measure of dominance (WD) is obtained 
by dividing the sum of wd scores by the total number of years (t) of the period studied. 
As an example, WD is calculated for the SPD and CDU in Lower Saxony between 1995 
and 2015 (Appendix Table A3). Compared to D, the 1995–2015 WD of CDU increases by 0.07 
while the SPD’s WD increases by less than 0.05. The difference is quite small. Yet since the 
SPD’s governmental experience was interrupted while the CDU was continuously in 
government for 10 years (2003–12), the score of the former increases by a smaller margin 
(16%) than that of the latter (22%). Of course, the difference between original and weighted 
scores is much more noticeable for parties at the top of Table A1 (see last column), which 
have been in power for the whole period. Yet changes in the ranking are minimal. Within the 
top 10 only the Galician PP would be replaced by the PP in Madrid. 
Table 2 shows that D and WD are strongly (almost perfectly) correlated (r = 0.995) and 
this points to the fact that the original score already captures important aspects of the time 
dimension. The table also provides an overview of the correlation between D and other 
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measures that are often used to assess party system or individual party’s dominance. It can 
be seen, for instance, that this measure is significantly correlated to the effective number of 
parties (ENP) developed by Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera (1979). The association is 
negative since, as expected, in more fragmented party systems, it is more difficult for a single 
party to establish a clearly dominant position. Yet the association is not very strong. This is 
because the ENP does not really measure dominance. A party may be more dominant when 
faced by a highly fragmented opposition. For instance, the SVP, the most dominant party in 
our sample, has consolidated its position in a context of moderate fragmentation which 
mainly affected the opposition in South Tyrol. In Lower Saxony, on the other hand, despite 
competing in a party system that is less fragmented than the South Tyrolean one, neither the 
CDU nor the SPD achieved high levels of dominance. 
More recently Taagepera (1999) provided a new measure to take into account the 
existence of a dominant party. This measure (ENPD) can be applied to the largest parties in 
regional government. It can be seen that, compared to ENP, the correlation with D is much 
stronger because ENPD better captures dominance. Of course, it is still negative because the 
higher the absolute dominance of a party, the lower its ENPD (since ENPD = 1/p, where p is 
the share of seats controlled by the largest party). 
Lastly Table 2 includes the measure of governmental dominance (GD) provided by Huo 
(2005). This measure focuses on the length of government tenure and bargaining strength of 
a party and, unlike ENP and ENPD, explicitly considers the ‘temporal’ dimension of 
government. GD correlates positively and rather strongly with both D and WD but is weakly 
correlated with ENP and ENPD. This may be due to the fact that GD is not clearly linked to the 
electoral dimension, as admitted by Huo himself. At the same time, both ENP and ENPD ignore 
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the time dimension of dominance and focus on the ‘party system’ rather than individual 
parties. 
 
[Table 2 here] 
A proof of the validity of D is that it is significantly correlated with all its main alternatives 
(including WD), even though such alternatives are not consistently correlated with each 
other. Therefore, it seems that it effectively captures different dimensions (electoral, 
governmental, temporal), which are often difficult to reconcile. 
 
Application of the index: an example 
D can be used to provide a preliminary explanation of why some ruling parties are more 
dominant than others at the regional level.6 Variation in dominance may depend on various 
factors. This article includes an exploratory quantitative analysis as an example of application 
to hypothesis testing. For instance, it can be hypothesized that dominance at the regional 
level depends on how dominant parties are at the national level. The case of the Christian 
Democratic Party (DC) in Italy between 1970 and 1990 is a good example of a party that was 
also able to control the governments of most Italian regions firmly while being nationally 
dominant. 
The positive association between national and regional dominance, however, may be 
dependent on the level of economic development of a region. The existence of interactions 
between regional attributes such as identity, distinctiveness or territorial mobilization and 
economic development has already been shown by studies focusing on regional governance 
(Keating and Loughlin 1997; Tatham and Thau 2014). Yet less attention has been paid to how 
statewide dominance is mediated by territorial economic factors. It can be hypothesized that 
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poorer regions are more dependent on centrally allocated resources and, as a consequence, 
tend to reward those parties that are in power at the national level. Again, the case of the DC 
is quite useful, since it tended to perform much better in the poorer regions of southern Italy 
(Leonardi and Wertman 1989). The Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) during its period of 
dominance under the leadership of Felipe González established its political stronghold in 
Andalusia (Bukowski 2002), one of the poorest Autonomous Communities, which was heavily 
reliant on the resources allocated by the central government. Takashi Inoguchi (1990) 
suggests that difficult economic conditions may in fact favour parties that are nationally 
dominant, particularly in a context of high dependence from centrally allocated resources. On 
the other hand, the effect of national dominance may be more moderate, or even negative, 
in wealthier regions, which may be more inclined to challenge central redistribution of 
resources. Additionally, socioeconomic development may lead to the emergence of post-
materialist values (Inglehart and Welzel 2005) and, as a consequence, the tendency to show 
less deference to dominant political elites at the national level and opt for political 
alternatives. 
D can also be calculated for parties in government at the national level. So, for 
instance, in Spain, the PSOE has a national D score of 0.224, the PP has a score of 0.441, the 
regionalist party Convergence and Union (CiU) has a score of 0 (since it has never been in 
central government), in Germany the SPD has a score of 0.17, and so on.7 Table 3 shows the 
results of a relatively simple linear regression model, which also includes country fixed effects 
to account for different institutional arrangements and country-specific traditions. The 
ideological orientation of a party on the left–right spectrum is also considered by relying on a 
simple dummy variable (centre-left = 1; centre and centre-right = 0). Model 1 shows that the 
coefficients of both national dominance and regional per capita GDP (both variables are also 
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average values over the period 1995–2015) are positive and statistically significant at 0.05 
and 0.01 levels. 
 
[Table 3 here] 
However, the effect of GDP on regional dominance is negatively affected by national 
dominance (and vice versa). Indeed, the interaction effect is negative and statistically 
significant at 0.05, meaning that parties that are nationally dominant are less able to establish 
their dominance in richer regions. This can be seen clearly in Figure 1, which is based on 
predicted values (based on the model) and shows that the association between GDP and 
regional dominance is positive for a party that from 1995 to 2015 has never played a dominant 
role at the national level (score = 0), whereas it becomes negative for a party scoring 0.5 in 
national dominance and even more negative for a party that has been highly dominant in 
central government (score = 1). 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
Model 2 excludes the country dummies because they are not statistically significant. This 
seems a good choice since the adjusted R-squared of Model 2 actually increases. Yet, rather 
than country-specific legacies, party-specific legacies may still play an important role. If we 
focus on the period from 1995 to 2015, we might hypothesize that parties that dominated 
regional politics in the previous period (1974–94) may rely on party allegiances that have 
consolidated over the decades. When we add the legacy control variable, the adjusted R-
squared increases substantially from 0.085 to 0.411, meaning that previous levels of 
dominance may explain a great part of the variation in more recent years. However, our key 
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independent variables remain statistically significant and this confirms that national political 
dynamics, interacting with territorial variation in economic development, play an important 
role in explaining different patterns of regional dominance. Future studies may test additional 
explanations – focusing, for instance, on different voting systems and cleavage structures – 
by using the index of party dominance presented here and developing more complex 
statistical models. 
Lastly, it should be noted that results of the regression analysis presented in Table 3 
would not significantly change if WD was used instead of D as dependent variable.8 
 
Aggregating dominance 
Once individual party scores have been calculated, how can we obtain an overall measure of 
party dominance for a region? In this case our unit of analysis is no longer the individual party 
but a polity (the region). The challenge is to aggregate individual party scores in order to 
compare regional political systems and see which have been characterized by more dominant 
ruling parties. In order to do so, we need to develop an aggregation strategy that takes into 
account differences between regions which, over a defined period of time, have been ruled 
by one party with a large D and others ruled by two (or more) parties alternating in 
government with smaller D scores. 
A simple sum or average of individual party scores would not be adequate. This can 
be easily shown by the following example. A study focuses on four regions over a period of 
10 years. We want to rank them according to the level of dominance of their governing 
parties. In Region 1, only one party has been the largest one in government with a D of 1. In 
Region 2, we have two parties alternating in government and scoring each 0.5. In Region 3 we 
also have two alternating parties but one, with a D of 0.9, has clearly been more dominant 
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than the other, which receives only 0.1. Lastly we have a region in which three parties have 
alternated as the largest ones in government, scoring 0.3, 0.3 and 0.4. If we simply added the 
individual D scores we would obtain an aggregate score of 1 in all cases, even though Region 
1 was ruled uninterruptedly by one party and Region 3 had a more clearly dominant party 
than Regions 2 and 4. If instead we decided to calculate the average, the main problem would 
be that Regions 2 and 3 would receive the same overall score (0.5). 
The least squares index used to measure disproportionality (Gallagher 1991) includes 
some elements that might also be helpful for the construction of an index that aggregates 
dominance scores of individual parties while capturing the cross-regional differences 
highlighted above. In the case of disproportionality, the vote–seat differences of each party 
are squared, summed and divided by two. Lastly, the square root of the result is taken. In our 
case we are not dealing with deviations between votes and seats and therefore we do not 
need to calculate differences and divide the sum of squares by two. However, the logic behind 
Michael Gallagher’s index is that the square root of a sum of squares will tend to be greater 
when we have few large deviations than when we have many small deviations. Similarly, if 
we used the square root of the sum of squares, regions with few parties having large D scores 
would tend to receive a greater overall score than regions with many parties having small D 
scores. Therefore, the following formula may be used to aggregate individual party scores for 
a regional system: 
𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 (𝐴𝑅𝐷) =  √∑ 𝐷2
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Where D is the overall dominance score of each party. Going back to our previous example of 
four regions, we would obtain the following results: 
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Region 1: ARD = √12= 1 
Region 2: ARD=√0.52 + 0.52 = √0.25 + 0.25 = √0.5 = 0.71 
Region 3: ARD = √0.92 + 0.12 = √0.81 + 0.01 = √0.82 = 0.91 
Region 4: ARD = √0.32 + 0.32 + 0.42  = √0.09 + 0.09 + 0.16 = √0.34 = 0.58 
With this method, Region 1, where only one party has been the main ruling party over the 
period considered (with a D of 1), obtains the highest score. The second largest score goes to 
Region 3, which has two D scores, but one clearly larger than the other and very close to that 
of Region 1. Then we have Region 2, where we have two main parties alternating in power 
with equal dominance. Finally the lowest score goes to Region 4, where, over a period of 10 
years, three parties have played the role of largest ruling party and have obtained relatively 
low dominance scores. 
Table A4 in the Appendix shows the ARD scores of the 54 regions considered in this 
study. The last column of the table also includes the difference between individual regional 
scores and the national score (calculated by using the same formula). It can be seen that most 
regions (42 out of 54) display ARDs that are higher than those at the national level (the 
difference is positive). This seems to confirm what Abedi and Schneider (2010: 77) suggest in 
their study of Canadian provinces and German Länder: ‘dominant party regimes are more 
frequent in … sub-national jurisdictions than in the capital cities’. Only some southern Italian 
regions (plus Friuli Venetia Giulia), Aragon, Cantabria, Berlin and Schleswig-Holstein have 
lower scores than their national systems. Interestingly, Italian regions are the majority in both 
the top 10 and bottom 10 in the ARD ranking and this seems to reflect some of the well-known 
differences existing between the north and the south of the country (Vassallo 2013). These 
data also suggest that, generally, regional governments tend to be more stable and more 
firmly controlled by ruling parties than national governments. 
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The ARD score can be used as an independent variable to explain variation in 
institutional performance of regions. So far, a clear measure of political dominance has not 
been used in studies focusing on ‘quality of government’ (see Charron et al. 2014). Again, a 
simple model is developed here in order to provide an example of how this measure can be 
applied to empirical studies in political and social sciences. We can test whether quality of 
government (QoG) tends to be higher (or lower) in those regions where overall dominance of 
ruling parties has been greater. We assume that QoG is the outcome of a medium- to long-
term process (Putnam 1993). Therefore, it makes sense to test whether today’s QoG is linked 
to political, economic and institutional factors that have been in place over a period of around 
two decades (from 1995 to 2015). 
Regional QoG, the dependent variable, is measured by relying on the European QoG 
Index (EQI) developed by Nicholas Charron, Lewis Dijkstra and Victor Lapuente (2014), ranging 
from 0 to 100, with higher scores indicating regions with higher quality government.9 Charron 
et al. also present a multiple linear regression model aimed at explaining cross-regional 
variation in EQI. An updated version of the model may also include our ARD, as the key 
independent variable to test the hypothesis that regions with more dominant ruling parties 
are also characterized by better institutional performance. Among the control variables that 
Charron et al. (2014) consider, we have human development and institutional autonomy 
enjoyed by a region. The former variable is measured by the Human Development Index (HDI) 
developed by Sjoerd Hardeman and Lewis Dijkstra (2014), which ranges from 0 to 100, with 
higher values suggesting higher levels of socioeconomic development (covering various 
dimensions such as income, health and education).10 Regional autonomy is measured by 
relying on the Regional Authority Index (RAI) developed by Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks and 
Arjan Schakel (2010). Charron et al. (2004) also hypothesize that regional QoG may be 
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associated with the size of a region operationalized in terms of population and surface, 
although they do not predict a clear direction of this association.11 They use the logged 
transformation of both variables, since their distribution is highly skewed and wide. Lastly, we 
should account for country-specific factors by introducing country fixed effects (reference 
category: Italy). 
Table 4 shows that the model accounts for 82% of the variation in quality of 
government. Interestingly, our ARD index is positively associated with the dependent 
variable. One point increase in aggregate dominance is expected to result in an average 
increase of almost five points in QoG, holding all other independent variables constant, and 
this effect is statistically significant at 0.05. This means that regions with governments led by 
more clearly dominant parties are characterized by better-performing institutions regardless 
of their socioeconomic situation, level of autonomy, population, size and country-specific 
factors. Coefficients of control variables, such as HDI and population, are statistically 
significant at 0.01, whereas institutional autonomy, measured by the RAI, is statistically 
significant at 0.1. Human development, regional authority and surface of the regions are 
positively associated with the quality of government (although the coefficient of the latter 
variable is not statistically significant). On the other hand, population size seems to have a 
negative effect on the dependent variable. Finally, country fixed effects are not statistically 
significant. 
Of course, this is just an example of how the new index could be applied to a relevant 
research question. Despite the results shown in the quantitative analysis, this article does not 
provide a normative framework – which would require a deeper theoretical discussion – and 
does not argue that party dominance is desirable in all contexts. More evidence is needed to 
reject (less optimistic) hypotheses that link dominance to corruption, party infighting and 
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decline in governmental responsiveness. In addition, the results discussed here do not tell us 
anything about the causal direction of the positive association between ARD and EQI. Again, 
starting from the preliminary results presented here, future studies could shed more light on 
the effects of party dominance on the effectiveness of subnational and national institutions. 
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
Conclusions 
This article has sought to provide two new measures of dominance that can be used to answer 
relevant questions in the field of political and social sciences. The first measure focuses on 
the largest parties in government and provides an assessment of their dominance by 
considering two dimensions, absolute and relative dominance, and linking them to a third 
dimension, time. An empirical analysis of 95 political parties that have governed in 54 regions 
of Italy, Spain and Germany between 1995 and 2015 shows that there is great variation in 
subnational levels of dominance and this is only partly explained by national political 
dynamics. In fact, it is shown that the relationship between regional dominance and national 
dominance is conditional on the level of socioeconomic development of a region. Richer 
regions seem to be less inclined to reward parties that are dominant at the national level. This 
may be explained by the fact that they are less dependent on centrally allocated resources or 
less ‘deferent’ to nationally dominant political elites. Furthermore, it seems that legacies 
explain great part of the variation in more recent levels of dominance. Many parties that were 
already dominant in the period from 1974 to 1994 have managed to maintain their position 
in the last two decades. This also seems to confirm the importance of time (one of the key 
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dimensions considered in this study), since long-term control of governmental positions may 
contribute to further stabilization of political dynamics and consolidation of power. 
The other index is aimed at aggregating party scores by polity (the region, in this case). 
It has been shown that averages or sums of individual party scores may provide misleading 
results and neglect significant differences existing across regions. For this reason, Aggregate 
Regional Dominance (ARD) is measured by relying on the square root of the sum of squares. 
This measure is positively associated with regional QoG, even controlling for variation in 
socioeconomic development, country-specific factors and different levels of institutional 
autonomy. Although the results of this preliminary analysis are not driven by a normative 
agenda and do not allow us to infer causality in a specific direction, it is interesting to note 
that regions ruled by more dominant parties are characterized by better-performing 
institutions. 
Future studies could apply the indexes presented here to a larger number of countries 
and regions (but also to local authorities, such as municipalities, provinces and counties). Of 
course, the cases analysed in this article are all ‘parliamentary’ systems, in which the 
dominance of the party in government depends on its control of a directly elected 
representative institution at the national, regional or local level (from parliament to local 
council, depending on the relevant territorial level). A possible refinement of the index should 
consider how dominance can be calculated in the case of presidential systems (Haggard and 
McCubbins 2001), in which the executive branch is separate from the legislative branch. A 
composite index taking into account governmental and legislative dominance separately may 
be developed in these cases. The main challenge is to weight and aggregate the governmental 
and legislative dimensions and produce a measure that is comparable to the one developed 
for parliamentary systems. 
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Notes
1 The term ‘sub-state’ can also be used. 
2 Huo also calculates the level of dominance of junior coalition partners. The selection of cases is not 
consistent, however (some important parties are excluded from the analysis). 
3 Or abstention from part of the opposition in the case of ‘minority governments’ (Strom, 1990). 
4 Sources: Germany: https://wahl.tagesschau.de/landtag.shtml; Spain: http://www.parties-and-
elections.eu/spain3.html; Italy: http://elezionistorico.interno.it/. All scores presented in the tables are 
calculated by author based on data from these sources.  
5 When two or more parties merge, I only consider the largest party for the years before the merger. 
6 As already pointed out, D and WD are almost perfectly correlated and using either of those would not 
significantly affect the results of the analysis (see the conclusion of this section). Therefore, I opted for the 
‘simpler’ index. 
7 The CDU and CSU are considered together at the national level since they are part of the same parliamentary 
group in the Bundestag (the Unionsfraktion). This is a crucial factor in determining who would play a ‘dominant’ 
role in coalition deals (i.e. who would be entitled to nominate the chancellor). 
8 One exception is the coefficient of the interaction effect in Model 3, which, while remaining negative (and 
actually increasing its magnitude from -0.074 to -0.085), loses its statistical significance. 
9 Data can be found at http://qog.pol.gu.se/data/datadownloads/qog-eqi-data (accessed 16 October 2016). It 
should be noted that the EQI data refer to 2013 and not to 2015. However, it can be assumed that QoG does 
not change radically within two years. 
10 All control variables are calculated as averages within the period considered. When some years are missing, 
the average is calculated across the available years. 
11 Charron et al. (2014) also include the variable ‘trust’ in their model. They use the data on social trust 
provided by Tabellini (2005), which, however, are not available for East German and some Italian and Spanish 
regions. Additionally, no statistically significant association between this variable and QoG is found. Therefore, 
trust is excluded from the analysis. 
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Table 1. High, Medium and Low Levels of Dominance Based on Sample Distribution 
 
Group Range of D Example of case selection 
High dominance 0.567–3.003  PP, Castile and Leon 
Medium dominance 0.56–0.113 PP, Cantabria 
Low dominance 0.005–0.11 PP, Castile la Mancha 
Note: PP = People’s Party. 
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Table 2. Correlation between Overall Dominance (D), Overall Weighted Dominance (WD) and 
Alternative Measures 
 D 
 
WD ENP ENPD 
 
GD  
D 1      
WD 0.995* 1     
ENP -0.3* -0.3* 1    
ENPD -0.513* -0.505* 0.84* 1   
GD 0.67* 0.657* 0.037 -0.249 1  
Notes: * p < 0.01. D = overall dominance; WD = overall weighted dominance; ENP = effective number of 
parties; ENPD = effective number of parties with dominance (Taagepera 1999) ; GD = governmental 
dominance. 
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Table 3. Explaining Party Dominance at the Regional Level: A Preliminary Model 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
National dominance 3.034** 
(1.338) 
3.134** 
(1.322) 
2.29** 
(1.167) 
Regional per capita 
GDP 
0.043*** 
(0.015) 
0.042*** 
(0.014) 
0.021* 
(0.012) 
National 
dominance* 
Regional per capita 
GDP 
-0.106** 
(0.05) 
-0.112** 
(0.053) 
-0.074* 
(0.043) 
Centre-left party -0.143 
(0.092) 
-0.15* 
(0.09) 
-0.13* 
(0.073) 
Spain -0.05 
(0.109) 
--- --- 
Germany -0.104 
(0.118) 
--- --- 
Legacy --- --- 0.571*** 
(0.08) 
Constant -0.607 
(0.387) 
-0.638 
(0.376) 
-0.302 
(0.305) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.072 0.085 0.411 
N 95 95 95 
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. 
  
34 
 
Table 4. Explaining Variation in Regional Quality of Government (measured as EQI): OLS Model 
Including Aggregate Regional Dominance (ARD) as a Key Independent Variable 
 Coefficients 
ARD 4.7** 
(2.3) 
HDI 0.93*** 
(0.16) 
RAI 3.4** 
(1.6) 
Population (log) -3.1*** 
(1.4) 
Surface (log) 0.89 
(1.2) 
Spain -8.9 
(10.1) 
Germany -9.6 
(14.9) 
Constant  -35.5 
(33.9) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.82 
N 54 
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Example of Party Dominance Scores: Social Democratic Party (SPD) and Christian 
Democratic Union (CDU) between 1995 and 2015 in Lower Saxony 
 
SPD CDU  
Absolute Relative d Absolute Relative d 
1995 0.503 1.21 0.61 0 0 0 
1996 0.503 1.21 0.61 0 0 0 
1997 0.503 1.21 0.61 0 0 0 
1998 0.529 1.34 0.71 0 0 0 
1999 0.529 1.34 0.71 0 0 0 
2000 0.529 1.34 0.71 0 0 0 
2001 0.529 1.34 0.71 0 0 0 
2002 0.529 1.34 0.71 0 0 0 
2003 0 0 0 0.497 1.44 0.72 
2004 0 0 0 0.497 1.44 0.72 
2005 0 0 0 0.497 1.44 0.72 
2006 0 0 0 0.497 1.44 0.72 
2007 0 0 0 0.497 1.44 0.72 
2008 0 0 0 0.447 1.42 0.63 
2009 0 0 0 0.447 1.42 0.63 
2010 0 0 0 0.447 1.42 0.63 
2011 0 0 0 0.447 1.42 0.63 
2012 0 0 0 0.447 1.42 0.63 
2013 0.358 0.91 0.32 0 0 0 
2014 0.358 0.91 0.32 0 0 0 
2015 0.358 0.91 0.32 0 0 0 
Overall 
Dominance 
(D) 
--- --- 0.302 --- --- 0.321 
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Table A2. D and DW Scores: 95 Parties in 54 Regions, 1995–2015 
Party Region D WD 
SVP South Tyrol 3.003 4.287 
UV Aosta Valley 1.774 2.643 
PDS/DS/PD Tuscany 1.5 2.167 
PDS/DS/PD Emilia Romagna 1.39 2.016 
CSU Bavaria 1.373 2.084 
CDU Saxony 1.305 1.819 
PP Murcia 1.253 1.976 
PDS/DS/PD Umbria 1.05 1.64 
PP Castile & Leon 0.975 1.46 
PP Galicia 0.95 1.144 
PP Madrid 0.842 1.277 
PDS/DS/PD Marche 0.79 1.149 
PP Rioja 0.766 1.169 
UPN Navarre 0.733 1.074 
PP Valencia 0.731 1.102 
CDU Thuringia 0.729 1.013 
SPD Brandenburg 0.72 0.971 
FI/PDL Lombardy 0.708 0.945 
PP Balearic Islands 0.644 0.692 
PSOE Andalusia 0.623 0.931 
CDU Baden-Württemberg 0.596 0.829 
PSOE Castile La Mancha 0.572 0.793 
SPD Bremen 0.567 0.878 
SPD Rhineland-Palatinate 0.56 0.841 
PSOE Extremadura 0.553 0.769 
PDS/DS/PD Liguria 0.552 0.634 
CiU Catalonia 0.513 0.583 
FI/PDL Arbuzzi 0.512 0.563 
CDU Hessen 0.511 0.714 
FI/PDL Piedmont 0.506 0.611 
PDS/DS/PD Latium 0.49 0.529 
PDS/DS/PD Basilicata 0.482 0.77 
PNV Basque Country 0.48 0.624 
CDU Saar 0.471 0.65 
DC/PPI/PD Trento 0.467 0.706 
PSOE Asturias 0.467 0.561 
CDU Saxony Anhalt 0.463 0.604 
SPD Hamburg 0.454 0.502 
FI/PDL Veneto 0.433 0.555 
SPD North Rhine-Westphalia 0.415 0.494 
SPD Mecklenburg 0.415 0.552 
CC Canary Islands 0.392 0.571 
37 
 
PP Cantabria 0.37 0.422 
FI/PDL Sicily 0.331 0.418 
SPD Schleswig-Holstein 0.322 0.407 
CDU Lower Saxony 0.321 0.391 
FI/PDL Apulia 0.319 0.41 
SPD Lower Saxony 0.302 0.351 
SPD Berlin 0.305 0.411 
FI/PDL Calabria 0.301 0.329 
PSOE Aragon 0.272 0.355 
FI/PDL Molise 0.27 0.346 
CDU Hamburg 0.264 0.333 
PDS/DS/PD Abruzzi 0.253 0.271 
PDS/DS/PD Piedmont 0.23 0.241 
PP Aragon 0.225 0.242 
FI/PDL Sardinia 0.221 0.244 
FI/PDL Friuli Venetia Giulia 0.21 0.23 
CDU Berlin 0.205 0.232 
PDS/DS/PD Friuli Venetia Giulia 0.198 0.21 
FI/PDL Campania 0.195 0.212 
SPD Saxony Anhalt 0.18 0.212 
PDS/DS/PD Molise 0.166 0.182 
CDU Schleswig-Holstein 0.154 0.177 
FI/PDL Liguria 0.15 0.165 
PDS/DS/PD Sardinia 0.146 0.155 
PDS/DS/PD Apulia 0.142 0.183 
CDU North Rhine-Westphalia 0.136 0.149 
PDS/DS/PD Campania 0.132 0.165 
SPD Saarland 0.13 0.139 
PRC Cantabria 0.114 0.122 
AN/PDL Latium 0.113 0.122 
PP Asturias 0.11 0.119 
LN Veneto 0.109 0.122 
PP Extremadura 0.101 0.109 
PP Castile La Mancha 0.101 0.109 
PSC-PSOE Catalonia 0.08 0.091 
CDU Mecklenburg 0.079 0.083 
SPD Hessen 0.074 0.08 
PSOE Balearic Islands 0.057 0.06 
DC Sicily 0.053 0.053 
PDS/DS/PD Calabria 0.052 0.056 
PSOE Cantabria 0.046 0.049 
PSOE Galicia 0.043 0.047 
PSOE Basque Country 0.04 0.042 
Greens Baden-Württemberg 0.038 0.042 
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PDS/DS/PD Sicily 0.034 0.036 
LN Friuli Venetia Giulia 0.034 0.035 
DL Thuringia  0.024 0.024 
FAC Asturias 0.018 0.018 
LN Liguria  0.011 0.011 
PPI Friuli Venetia Giulia 0.01 0.01 
PSOE Navarre 0.006 0.006 
PSOE Valencia 0.006 0.006 
GB Navarre 0.005 0.005 
Note: PDS = Democratic Party of the Left; DS = Left Democrats; UPN = Navarrese People’s Union; FI = 
Forward Italy; PDL = People of Freedom; PNV = Basque Nationalist Party; PPI = Italian People’s Party; 
CC = Canarian Coalition; PRC = Regionalist Party of Cantabria; AN = National Alliance; LN = Northern 
League; PSC-PSOE = Socialist Party of Catalonia; DL = Die Linke; FAC = Asturias Forum; GB = Geroa 
Bai. All other party names and abbreviations are included in the main text.   
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Table A3. Applying Weights to the Example of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and 
Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in Lower Saxony 
 
SPD CDU 
 d Weight wd d Weight wd 
1995 0.61 1 0.61 0 0 0 
1996 0.61 1.05 0.6405 0 0 0 
1997 0.61 1.1 0.671 0 0 0 
1998 0.71 1.15 0.8165 0 0 0 
1999 0.71 1.2 0.852 0 0 0 
2000 0.71 1.25 0.8875 0 0 0 
2001 0.71 1.3 0.923 0 0 0 
2002 0.71 1.35 0.9585 0 0 0 
2003 0 0 0 0.72 1 0.72 
2004 0 0 0 0.72 1.05 0.756 
2005 0 0 0 0.72 1.1 0.792 
2006 0 0 0 0.72 1.15 0.828 
2007 0 0 0 0.72 1.2 0.864 
2008 0 0 0 0.63 1.25 0.7875 
2009 0 0 0 0.63 1.3 0.819 
2010 0 0 0 0.63 1.35 0.8505 
2011 0 0 0 0.63 1.4 0.882 
2012 0 0 0 0.63 1.45 0.9135 
2013 0.32 1 0.32 0 0 0 
2014 0.32 1.05 0.336 0 0 0 
2015 0.32 1.1 0.352 0 0 0 
Overall 
dominance 
(D & WD) 
0.302 
 
0.351 0.321 
 
0.391 
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Table A4. Aggregate Regional Dominance (ARD) in Italian, Spanish and German regions, 1995–
2015 
Region ARD Difference 
Regional – National ARD 
South Tyrol 3.003 2.609 
Aosta Valley 1.77 1.376 
Tuscany 1.5 1.106 
Emilia Romagna 1.391 0.997 
Bavaria 1.373 0.961 
Saxony 1.305 0.893 
Murcia 1.253 0.785 
Umbria 1.049 0.655 
Castile Leon 0.975 0.507 
Galicia 0.949 0.481 
Madrid 0.842 0.374 
Marche 0.79 0.396 
La Rioja 0.766 0.298 
Navarre 0.733 0.265 
Valencia 0.731 0.263 
Thuringia 0.729 0.317 
Brandenburg 0.72 0.308 
Lombardy 0.708 0.314 
Balearic 0.646 0.178 
Andalusia 0.623 0.155 
Baden-Württemberg 0.597 0.185 
Castile Mancha 0.581 0.113 
Liguria 0.572 0.178 
Abruzzi 0.571 0.177 
Bremen 0.57 0.158 
Extremadura 0.562 0.094 
Rhineland-Palatinate 0.56 0.148 
Piedmont 0.556 0.162 
Hamburg 0.525 0.113 
Catalonia 0.52 0.052 
Hessen 0.517 0.105 
Latium 0.502 0.108 
Saxony Anhalt 0.496 0.084 
Saar 0.489 0.077 
Basilicata 0.482 0.088 
Basque 0.482 0.014 
Asturias 0.48 0.012 
Trento 0.467 0.073 
Veneto 0.447 0.053 
Lower Saxony 0.441 0.029 
North Rhine-Westphalia 0.437 0.025  
Mecklenburg 0.422 0.01 
Canary 0.392 -0.076 
Cantabria 0.389 -0.079 
Berlin 0.367 -0.045 
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Schleswig-Holstein 0.357 -0.055 
Aragon 0.353 -0.115 
Apulia 0.349 -0.045 
Sicily 0.337 -0.057 
Molise 0.317 -0.077 
Calabria 0.305 -0.089 
Friuli Venetia Giulia 0.291 -0.103 
Sardinia 0.265 -0.129 
Campania 0.235 -0.159 
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Figure 1. Effect of GDP on party regional dominance depending on level of party national 
dominance 
 
 
